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We empirically investigate the factors that drive China's outward FDI using dynamic 
panel methods for 27 countries from 1995 to 2002.  Based on the literature review 
we test three hypotheses: comparative advantages in low wage countries, vertical 
integration towards resource and human capital abundant countries, and the 
transaction-enforcing FDI to complement exports.  Our results provide strong 
support for the transaction-enforcing motive: China’s FDI follows exports.  Next, 
only in the presence of exports, low income per capita is important arguably because 
low-income countries have a preference for Chinese low-cost exports. Finally, 
though this series we find no evidence of FDI to skill-abundant countries and no 
evidence that host market resources or governance matters. 
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 I. Introduction 
 
  In addition to attracting massive amounts FDI over time China has also become a 
major source of outward FDI. In 2005 FDI outflow from China amounted to U.S. $12.3 
billion (1.68 percent of the world total).  By 2003 3,439 mainland Chinese enterprises had 
set up 7,470 companies in 139 countries. Of these firms, 27% are in manufacturing, 14% in 
commercial services, and 10% in wholesale and retail trade. Major overseas investors are 
listed below along with their foreign share of total assets in parentheses:  China Ocean 
Shipping Group (31%), China National Cereal, Oils and Foodstuff Import and Export 
(42%), China National Chemicals Import and Export (40%), and China National Offshore 
Oil Corporation (27%).  Many of the Chinese firms investing abroad are publicly owned, 
either by the state or by the provinces. However, limited liability firms from mainland 
China are increasingly engaged in outward FDI (UNCTAD 2003, 2004, 2005). 
 
  The purpose of this paper is to attempt to formulate an explanation for the rise in 
outward FDI from China. In general, there are two  major theories about developing 
country FDI.  First, outward FDI may follow a specific development path, increasing with 
the level of national income (e.g. see: Dunning et al. 1997).  Second, and this is the focus of 
our research, FDI can be explained by host country characteristics. Heretofore the lion’s 
share of the empirical literature deals with FDI from developed countries, and supports the 
thesis that horizontal FDI dominates because the market size of the host country is the most 
important determinant.
1 In contrast, there are only a few limited studies of the locational 
determinants of FDI from developing countries.2  Explanations for this gap may be that 
developing countries are a heterogeneous group in which most countries have been less 
important players in cross-border investment, and that firms in developing countries are 
small so that the internationalization strategy is of limited importance to them. Or, that data 
on FDI from developing countries are less reliable.  
 
  In  light of China’s rising economic prowess we investigate the causal relation 
                                                  
1 See for example Culem (1988) for OECD countries, Lunn (1980) for the EU, Hines (1996) for the US, and 
many more recent papers.   2 
between the dynamics of China’s export markets and its FDI flows.  In addition, we hope to 
draw some insights regarding the evolving pattern of China’s foreign trade.  Although still 
a developing country, China has rapidly become an important global investor.  By studying 
China’s FDI we hope to fill a more general gap by investigating what drives developing 
countries overseas investments. Our main conclusion is that we find strong support for the 
transaction-enforcing role of FDI.  That is, Chinese firms mainly invest in countries to 
which they export. 
 
  In the present section we limit our discussion to  four other studies on  China’s 
outward FDI that are relevant to our research. Liu et al. (2005) is part of the large empirical 
literature that analyzes the investment development path (IDP) of developing countries. 
They investigate how China's outward FDI is related to its internal economic development. 
Liu et al.  show that FDI follows exports as a later stage of China’s economic development. 
Their work focuses on the “push” determinants for FDI in the home country. In contrast 
our paper analyzes the pull factors in the host country. These and other papers adopt an 
individual time-series approach in which they regress the total outward FDI on the 
development of home country characteristics, including total exports.  For a review of this 
literature see: Bajo-Rubio and Montero-Muño (2001).  
 
  Yang (2005) analyzes the outward FDI of China by using a network approach. In 
line with our empirical findings, he argues that Chinese firms try to build foreign networks 
to sell their products. As in our paper, he investigates the host country characteristics of 
China's FDI. However, in contrast to our paper his analysis is theoretical and descriptive. 
Overall, our empirical results are supportive to his findings in that we find an empirical 
relationship running from exports to FDI. Buckley et al. (2007) investigate the locational 
determinants of China’s FDI more generally. The focus of their paper is on explaining the 
factors that drive FDI for separate historical eras, thereby giving insights in the external 
political priorities of different regimes.  Although their study provides interesting 
correlations for a broad set of host country characteristics (including market size and 
exports), they do not consider causality and dynamics between exports and FDI, nor 
                                                                                                                                                    
2 Exceptions are Pangarkar and Lim (2003) for Singapore and Erdilek (2003) for Turkey.   3 
interaction with other factors. In contrast we find that market size does not matter without 
exports, which – together with the dynamics and other interaction terms – leads us to the 
conclusion that China’s FDI is predominantly transaction enforcing and not market 
seeking. 
 
  The remainder of the paper is set up as follows. In Part II we discuss the literature 
on FDI from developing countries to derive three hypotheses to explain the rise of FDI 
from China. Part III introduces the data and discusses the empirical issues. Part IV presents 
the results of the panel data estimation with special attention to the internal dynamics to 
disentangle a complex interrelationship between FDI and exports. Part V concludes and 
discusses the limitations of our research. 
 
II. Theories on FDI from developing countries 
 
  Beginning with the seminal work of Lecraw (1977) and Wells (1983), there is a 
large and growing theoretical literature on the locational determinants of FDI. The early 
contributions focused on explaining what makes FDI from developing countries different 
from that of firms from developed countries. From this  literature three potential 
explanations for FDI emerge.  First, originating from the work of Markusen (1984, 1995, 
and 2002) there is the assumption that firms have multi-plant economies, and that they are 
mainly engaged in horizontal FDI.  In this framework firms have a certain competitive 
ownership advantage that can be extended to foreign markets by engaging in FDI. For 
firms from developed countries, often such competitive advantages are  based on  the 
ownership of intellectual property such as patents, brand names, and management systems. 
The broad implication for FDI strategies is that firms choose to locate in foreign markets 
where they can sell their differentiated products.  These are typically countries with large 
internal markets and high-income consumers, i.e. FDI goes to other high income countries. 
 
  In the early literature it was also argued that ownership advantages of multinational 
enterprises from developing countries  result in the opposite  pattern. Because  the 
competitive advantage of developing countries firms lies in their superior management of   4 
low-cost production processes MNEs from developing countries invest in other low wage 
countries (Tolentino 1993).  Similarly Ferrantino (1992), Benito and Gripsrud (1995), and 
Dunning (1997) argue that developing countries invest in other developing countries to 
exploit proximity in ethnicity, culture and geography. Yin and Choi (2005) show that these 
elements are important for Asian multinationals investing in China. In other words, 
developing countries mainly invest in their neighbours. 
 
  A second explanation in the form of vertical FDI can be found in the work of 
Helpman (1984 and 1987). He argues that firms break up their value chain by shifting parts 
of their production processes overseas. In more recent papers it is noted that firms from 
developed countries locate skill-intensive headquarter services in Northern countries, and 
production facilities in Southern countries that are assumed to have manufacturing  lower 
costs.  These lower transaction costs result in FDI and outsourcing of labor-intensive stages 
of the production process towards lower wage countries. From this the inference drawn is 
that developing countries' FDI strategies may well differ  from those of richer countries 
because firms from developing countries typically have a comparative advantage in labor- 
intensive production. That being the case vertical specialization may induce them to shift 
skill-intensive activities (such as design, R&D and marketing) to developed countries 
where there are more high-skill employees. Also, because firms in developing countries 
specialize in mass production at the end of the product cycle this type of production 
involves natural resource intensive processes. This pattern leads to vertical integration by 
buying the companies that source their production.  Therefore, FDI is  then  aimed at 
securing resources such as energy, commodities and minerals. 
 
  The third view is based on the early work by Hymer (1960) and that of the Uppsala 
School.  Here the idea is that FDI incrementally follows exports: investments are often 
transaction-enforcing in that they support existing exports.
3 Based on survey data, this type 
of FDI seems to be important for Chinese companies. In a questionnaire by MOFTEC (The 
Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation), when asked why they to engage in 
FDI, 47% of Chinese executives indicated that the primary reason was to expand overseas 
                                                  
3 See also Yeung (1998) for an application to Singapore and Malaysia.   5 
markets (Li 2000). In their survey, UNCTAD (2003: 5) also notes that buying local 
distribution  channels to  facilitate exports is a major reason for Chinese firms' FDI to 
mature markets.  Similarly, earlier studies by Zhang and Den Bulcke (1996) found that the 
top motive for foreign investment by Chinese firms is to advance exports.
4 Based on their 
suvey in 1993, Table 1 shows motives of 16 large- and medium-sizes Chinese firms and 31 
of their overseas manufacturing subsidiaries to invest abroad.  
 












Expansion into new market  3.4  3.8  3.3  3.6 
To advance exports of parent company  3.4  3.6  3.2  3.5 
To be near export markets  3.3  3.6  3.2  3.4 
Access to information abroad   2.9  3.8  2.8  3.3 
Following home country’s strategy  4.0  2.3  3.2  3.2 
To build up international experience  3.1  3.3  2.8  3.1 
Access to third country markets  2.8  3.5  2.8  3.1 
Diversification of production  2.3  3.2  3.0  2.9 
Higher rate of profit abroad  2.9  2.2  3.3  2.6 
To use product innovation  3.2  2.2  2.7  2.6 
 
Data source: Zhang and Bulcke. International Management Strategies of Chinese Multinational Firms, in 
John Child and Yuan Liu (1996) (eds), Management Issues in China (II): International Enterprises, London: 
Routledge 1996. Note: 29 firms responded, of which 8 were most recent subsidiaries, 8 the oldest and 5 the 
largest subsidiaries. The importance of each motive was ranked on a 1-5 point scale: 1 = very limited, 2 = 
limited, 3 = moderate, 4 = important and 5 = very important. 
 
  Summarizing the existing literature on the locational determinants of the host 
country to attract FDI from developing countries we have deduced three hypotheses: 
 
H1:  When  horizontal FDI serves to extend a competitive  advantage in low-cost 
production investment flows to countries that also have lower wages. 
 
H2: Because developing countries need natural resources to support their industrialization, 
                                                  
4 Ekholm et al. (2003) argue that export may not be consumed in the host country only, for many countries 
serve as a platform for re-exportation. For example, this may explain the large exports of China to Peru. 
   6 
vertical FDI flows to countries with natural resources and abundant human capital. 
 
H3: When FDI is transaction enforcing investment flows increase with exports to the host 
country. 
 
           The following section discuses our research strategy for disentangling the complex 
motives that determine China’s outward FDI.  
 
III. Data and Methodology 
 
  The sample panel covers China's 27 main outward FDI destinations over 8 years 
(1995-2002). We use a smaller sample of 27 countries than the top 30 host economies 
listed in Table 2 below.  Specifically, Hong Kong and Macao are special cases because 
though they are economically independent they are part of China. Second, we exclude the 
U.S. because although the US is only one observation, in reality this bilateral interaction 
greatly affects much of the FDI from China. While including the U.S. does not change the 
statistical results, we felt that the analysis would be less affected by any distortions arising 
from this interaction.  We will discuss this issue in the conclusion. 
 
Table2: China’s approved FDI outflows, top 30 destinations, 1979-2002 
(Millions of US dollars) 
               
2002  1979-2002  Rank  Economy 
Numbers of 
projects 






  Total  350  982.7  6960  9340.0 
1  Hong Kong, China  40  355.6  2025  4074.3 
2  United States  41  151.5  703  834.5 
3  Canada  4  1.2  144  436.0 
4  Australia  15  48.6  215  431.0 
5  Thailand  5  3.9  234  214.7 
6  Russian Federation  27  35.5  482  206.6 
7  Peru  ..  ..  20  201.2 
8  Macao, China  2  2.0  229  183.7 
9  Mexico  1  2.0  45  167.4   7 
10  Zambia  1  0.3  18  134.4 
11  Cambodia  3  5.1  61  125 
12  Brazil  8  9.3  67  119.7 
13  South Africa  3  1.7  98  119.3 
14  Republic of Korea  7  83.4  62  107.8 
15  Viet Nam  20  27.2  73  85 
16  Japan  11  18.2  236  82.1 
17  Singapore  6  2.1  172  71.7 
18  Myanmar  5  15.8  38  66.1 
19  Indonesia  6  3.7  59  65 
20  Mali  ..  ..  5  58.1 
21  Mongolia  7  3.4  69  56.6 
22  Germany  6  2.8  150  51.5 
23  New Zealand  2  0.9  26  48.7 
24  Egypt  3  16.3  27  48.5 
25  Oman  1  17.5  70  47.2 
26  Papua New Guinea  ..  ..  20  44.7 
27  Nigeria  9  11.4  49  44.3 
28  Tanzania  2  0.4  19  41.3 
29  Kazakhstan  3  26.9  51  39.6 
30  Lao PDR  2  61  18  36.6 
 
Source: Ministry of Commerce of China, The Almanac of China’s Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation 
2003. Regions are ranked by China’s cumulative investment value. 
 
  The transaction-enforcing hypothesis is tested by analyzing exports (EXPORTS) to 
the 27 countries.  These data are available from the National Bureau of Statistics of China. 
The dependent variable is approved outward FDI (FDI) taken from MOFTEC (2003). 
Based on the theories of horizontal FDI, vertical FDI, and transaction-enforcing FDI, we 
focus on the following explanatory variables: market size of the host country, the host 
country labor costs, natural resource abundance, skill intensity, and the exports from China. 
As is standard in the literature, we use GDP
5 to capture the market size and GDP per capita 
as a proxy for wage rates (GDPPC) in the host economy.  See for example: Helpman (1987) 
and Brainard (1997). The source of both of these series is the UNCTAD database. The 
RESOURCES variable is based on the exports share of fuel, ore and minerals in the total 
merchandise exports. Skill intensity is reflected by the human capital indicator (the World 
Bank Institute), the high-tech exports in total exports, the number of researchers per 1000 
                                                  
5 The lagged one year GDP is applied to solve the multicollinearity problem, as in Culem (1988).  
   8 
residents, and R&D applications (World Bank Development Indicators, 2005). Further, we 
control for governance, distance, ethnicity, and other factors such as GDP growth rate, that 
have been previously found to influence FDI. The outward FDI, exports, GDP, GDPPC are 
measured in US dollars in current prices and current exchange rates. A few surveys 
indicate the significant impact of national political infrastructure of the host country on 
FDI inflows. The governance indicator  NPI is taken from the World Bank Institute 
(Kaufmann et al. 1999) and measured by six governance indicators, which are voice and 
accountability, political stability, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, 
and control of corruption. DISTANCE is the distance between the capital of the FDI 
destination and that of China and can represent the trade costs between nations.  ETHNIC is 
measured by the share of Chinese speaking population in the FDI recipients and can reflect 
the ethic relationship between FDI home and host nations. Year dummies are included to 
control for time trend. Summary and correlations for all variables are presented in Tables 
3.1 and 3.2. Moreover, Figures 1 and 2 show some features of outward FDI and exports. 
 










Variable  Obs.  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max 
lnAFDO  216                     1.3595  1.2596  0  4.8065 
lnGDP  216  10.8622  2.2441  6.7945  15.4816 
lnEXPORTS  216  6.1944  2.0526  2.1282  10.7879 
lnGDPPC  216  7.5828  1.7076  4.8441  10.6498 
RESOURCES  211  27.3956  28.6761  0  100 
lnNPI  216  -0.7039  0.3539  -1.6820  -0.1210 
lnHDI  216  -0.3992  0.2783  -1.1809  -0.0222 
RESEARCH  216  1.1304  1.5305  0  5.37 
TECHEXPE  216  3.5243  3.6742  0  14.5 
HITEEXP  216  10.5863  12.8861  0.05  61.5 
GDPGR  216  3.6164  3.7429  -13.13  13.75 
ETHNIC  216  0.1111  0.3149  0  1 
DISTANCE  216  7243.29  4499.632  955.6511  16948.04   9 
Table 3.2: Correlations 
 
  lnAFDO  lnGDPt-1  lnEXP  lnGDPPC  RES~  lnNPI  lnHDI  RESE~  TECH  HITEEXP
lnAFDO  1.0000                   
lnGDPt-1  -0.0014  1.0000                 
lnEXPORTS  0.0646  0.8631  1.0000               
lnGDPPC  -0.1495  0.7970  0.6562  1.0000             
RESOURCES  -0.0061  -0.2096  -0.3256  -0.1657  1.0000           
lnNPI  -0.1802  0.5190  0.4098  0.8584  -0.2470  1.0000         
lnHDI  -0.0396  0.7646  0.7388  0.8704  -0.1675  0.6614  1.0000       
RESEARCH  -0.1690  0.6251  0.6613  0.7642  -0.1797  0.6429  0.6657  1.0000     
TECHEXPE  -0.0383  0.6366  0.6146  0.7363  -0.3226  0.6961  0.6832  0.6751  1.0000   
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  In Part 3 we present the results of static random effects estimation.6  We use a 
random effects model because we have a limited number of cross-sectional observations as 
well as a limited number of years.
7 To compensate for this we investigate several models 
which allow us to identify variables that are consistently significant across regressions. 
 
  Unfortunately our base-line random effects regression does not allow us to make a 
clear distinction between the hypotheses. First, EXPORTS may well be endogenous to 
market size (GDP), so that it is unclear what the EXPORTS variable captures (are exports 
to some extent a reflection of GDP?)  By including an interaction term between the two, we 
are able to shed more light on which of these two variables is more important. The same 
problem holds for EXPORTS and GDP per capita (GDPPC). It may well be that FDI 
towards low wage countries is caused by the fact that low wage countries prefer the 
low-price product from China (so the transaction-enforcing motive is important). However, 
it may also be that firms from China set up new production facilities (horizontal FDI) in 
low wage countries. Again, adding an interaction t erm  clarifies the results,  and this 
regression helps to separate the arguments. 
 
  From the static panel a picture emerges that the transaction-enforcing motive for 
FDI dominates for China. However, from previous analyses based on long-term series for a 
single country (e.g. see:   Bajo-Rubio and Montero-Munoz 2001 and the references therein), 
we know that various dynamic and interdependent relations between FDI and exports may 
make it difficult to establish the causal effects. These are complicated issues to address 
with certainty, but there are  accepted techniques to deal with this issue. We use 
Arellano-Bond GMM dynamic panel-data estimation to get at the causality relationship 
between FDI and the exports. Assuming that (a) the error term is not serially correlated and 
(b) the explanatory variables are weakly exogenous, we are able to use internal instruments 
                                                  
6 We first tested the panel unit roots and panel  cointegration. A ll the series concerned are  I ( 1) but 
cointegrated.   We do not report the test results  for two reasons.  First, the sample covers only 8 years, which 
is too short to obtain the valid panel unit roots, and cointegration tests results (assuming T is finite). Second, 
first-differencing in the dynamic analysis helps to insure the stability of the cointegration framework.  
 
7 All pass the Hausman test. We have conducted the fixed effects estimations, of which the results are 
qualitatively the same at a lower level of significance. 
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based on a dynamic  first-differenced model.  Taking first-differences is necessary to 
eliminate the country-specific effects, and let us work with the cointegrated series. The 
internal instruments are used to deal with the possible endogeneity of the explanatory 
variable (EXPORTS) and the lagged dependent variable.
8 Clearly, the  disadvantage of 
using first-differences is that we may lose significant variables that are close to constant 
over time. We will see that this has important implications for the explanatory power of the 
wage variable because GDPPC is relatively stable when compared to the other variables. 
Moreover, by applying a panel error correction model,9 we find the dynamic effects of a 
change in exports upon current (short-run) and future (long-run) FDI. We also employ 
Arellano-Bond GMM dynamic panel-data estimation to solve the endogeneity problem in 
this case.   
 
IV. Panel estimation results 
 
  Table 4 reports the results from the random effects model. The following results 
stand out. In Column (1) we see that FDI is positively correlated with EXPORTS and 
negatively with wages (GDPPC). Hence, the estimation results present first evidence that 
FDI has a transaction-enforcing motive and an ownership motive. Since we observe that 
market size is insignificant, this contradicts the horizontal FDI hypothesis. To check 
robustness, we ran various regressions controlling for skill intensity in the host country. 
We fail to find evidence in favour of vertical FDI towards skill-intensive host countries. In 
addition, observe that three controls perform poorly. First, for the period 1995-2002 the 
variable RESOURCES seems to be uncorrelated with China's FDI. Second, the share of 
Chinese speaking population (ETHNIC) is insignificant. Third, China's FDI seems not to 
be influenced by governance indicators (NPI). Also, note that the DISTANCE variable is 
positive, indicating that neighbouring counties are not the important hosts for China's FDI.  
 
                                                  
8 The new error term eit – eit-1 is correlated with the lagged dependent variable yit-1 – yit-2. The GMM estimates 
are derived based on the conditions: yit-s and Xit-s are not correlated with eit – eit-1, s = 2.  
 
9  The error correction model is specified  as 11 itititititiit yXXyCVv aglrbe -- =+D+++++ .  The 
short-run effect of exports is ?, and the long-run impact can be measured by ?/1- ?. 
   12 
            Columns (2) and (3) present the interaction results for the three main variables. In 
Column (2), note that the interaction term between exports and GDP is insignificant and 
the coefficient is very small.  This leads us to exclude the possibility that exports and GDP 
both contribute to FDI. In other words, exports matter more than market size. In Column 
(3), including the interaction term for GDP per capita and exports shows that both  terms 
with GDP per capita are insignificant, though jointly significant. We conclude that low 
wages do not matter in the absence of exports. This result serves as evidence that the 
transaction-enforcing motive dominates the ownership advantage motive in low wage 
production.  Additional robustness checks are presented in Column (4) and (5). First, we 
control for openness of the host country, to see whether the export-hub hypothesis is 
supported. The term is insignificant. Second, we control for total FDI received by the host 
country. This result is also insignificant. Finally, falling to account for substitution over 
time (Bloningen 2001) we add a quadratic exports term. We do not find a negative effect on 
exports in this sample. 
 
Table 4: Static panel results 
Dependent variable is the log of China's outward FDI 
 
Independent Var.  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
lnGDPt-1  -0.102   0.203   -0.122   -0.135   -0.052 
  [0.58]  [0.73]  [0.69]  [0.55]  [0.29] 
lnGDPPC  -0.238**  -0.218*  0.063  -0.21  -0.214* 
  [2.11]  [1.93]  [0.23]  [1.44]  [1.89] 
lnEXPORTS  0.307*  0.669**  0.645*  0.357*  0.576* 
  [1.74]  [2.17]  [1.93]  [1.74]  [1.84] 
lnEXPORTS
2          -0.028 
          [1.05] 
RESOURCES  0.002  0.000  0.000  0.002  0.001 
  [0.39]  [0.02]  [0.06]  [0.34]  [0.25] 
ETHNIC  -0.302  -0.429  -0.423  -0.277  -0.318 
  [0.72]  [1.01]  [0.98]  [0.48]  [0.77] 
DISTANCE   0.461  0.299  0.458  0.552*  0.343 
  [1.58]  [0.96]  [1.57]  [1.72]  [1.11] 
OPENNESS        -0.099   
        [0.23]   
OTHERFDI        -0.017   
        [0.17]   
lnGDPt-1*lnEXPORTS    -0.04         13 
    [1.43]       
lnGDPPC* lnEXPORTS     -0.043     
      [1.19]     
F-test (p-value)    Exports:  
p = 0.08 
GDP:  
p = 0.30  
Exports:  
p = 0.10 
GDPPC:  
p = 0.05 
  Exports:  
p = 0.12 
 
 
Note: Robust z statistics in brackets: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. No. of Observations = 189. All results 
are from the random effects estimation and pass Hausman test. Other variables used but not reported because 
of insignificance:  GDPGR,  Skill intensity (measured by various indicators: human capital indicator, 
high-tech exports, the number of researchers per 1000 residents, and R&D applications), governance 
indicator (NPI), and ASIA dummy; year dummies included. Standard errors are corrected for the first-order 
autocorrelation.  
   
  In Part 2 we mentioned that it is difficult to find a clear causal relation between 
exports and FDI because of the complex interdependence of these variables.  Table 5 
presents the Arellano-Bond GMM estimates. The serial correlation tests support the null 
that there is no second-order autocorrelation. The Sargan test shows the exogeneity of the 
instrument variables. We observe that only the coefficient of exports from China is 
significant, except for the lagged dependent variable. Further note that in Column (4) the 
EXPORTS variable is negative and the squared EXPORTS variable is positive. This leads 
us to surmise that FDI follow exports after a certain base level is achieved. This result 
strongly negates the hypothesis that exports crowd out FDI over time, and again supports 
the transaction-enforcing motive. For robustness, we report the results of using the large 
sample including Hong Kong, Macao, and the US in Column (5). The impact of exports is 
more significant in this large sample.  
 
         Furthermore,  Table  6 shows the inner-relation between Exports and FDI. This 
provides additional strong evidence that the relation runs from exports to FDI and not the 
other way around. This finding shows that FDI follows exports, but is not important to 
promote further exports. Here we suppose that factors used to explain FDI are similar to 
those for the exports. 
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Table 5: Arellano-Bond Dynamic GMM estimates 
Dependent variable is differenced log outward FDI 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
DlnAFDOt-1  0.223**  0.129  0.127  0.078  0.212*    
  [2.08]  [1.35]  [1.34]  [0.85]  [1.79] 
DlnGDPt-1  -0.388  -0.686  -0.369  0.149  -0.445 
  [0.37]  [0.61]  [0.41]  [0.16]  [0.54] 
DlnGDPPC  0.527  0.627  0.452  0.414  0.064 
  [0.53]  [0.66]  [0.32]  [0.44]  [0.06] 
DlnEXPORTS   0.841***  0.542  0.975  -0.949  0.965*** 
  [2.45]  [0.39]  [0.74]  [1.21]  [2.76] 
D(lnEXPORTS)
2         0.147**   
        [2.35]   
DRESOURCES  0.011  0.000  0.014  -0.002  0.016 
  [0.41]  [0.01]  [0.53]  [0.09]  [0.58]    
D (lnGDPt-1* lnEXPORTS)    0.030       
    [0.24]       
D (lnGDPPC* lnEXPORTS)      -0.015     
      [0.09]     
F-test (p-value)    Exports:  
p = 0.02 
GDP:  
p = 0.82 
Exports:  
p = 0.02 
GDPPC:  
p = 0.92 
Exports:  
p = 0.00 
 
Sargan test (p-value)  0.997  0.999  0.999  0.100  0.100 
Second-order AR  (p-value)  0.757  0.661  0.519  0.707  0.535 
 
Note: Robust z statistics in brackets: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. No. of Observations = 162. Other 
variables used but not reported because of insignificance: Skill intensity, NPI, and GDPGR. Year dummies 
are included.  
Table 6: Inner-relation between FDI and Exports 
 
Independent  Dependent    Dependent 
  DlnAFDO  DlnEXPORTS 
DlnEXPORTS  -0.949 [1.21]   
D(lnEXPORTS)
2   0.147** [2.35]   
DlnAFDO    0.046 [0.64] 
D(lnAFDO)2    -0.001 [0.07] 
F-test (p-value)  p = 0.00  p = 0.13 
 
Note: Robust z statistics in brackets: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
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         Finally, Table 7 offers the dynamic GMM estimation results of the panel error 
correction model. For these results it is clear that an increase in exports leads to an increase 
in FDI and an even larger FDI growth over time.  
 
Table 7: Arellano-Bond Dynamic GMM estimates of the panel error correction model 
Dependent variable is differenced outward log FDI 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
DlnAFDOt-1 ( r)  0.390***  0.093  0.138  0.111 
  [3.67]  [0.95]  [1.42]  [1.19] 
DlnGDPt-1  0.366  -0.006  -0.585  0.098 
  [0.21]  [0.00]  [0.63]  [0.10] 
DlnGDPPC  1.528  0.549  0.410  0.238 
  [0.74]  [0.58]  [0.26]  [0.25] 
D DlnEXPORTS ( g )  1.748***  0.986***  0.996***  0.740* 
  [3.85]  [2.59]  [2.55]  [1.89] 
DlnEXPORTSt-1 (l )  1.589***  1.400  0.655  -1.189 
  [2.87]  [0.94]  [0.42]  [1.41] 
D(D lnEXPORTS
2
)         -0.374 
        [0.60] 
D(lnEXPORTSt-1)
2          0.160** 
        [2.33] 
DRESOURCES  0.002  0.011  0.013  0.017 
  [0.07]  [0.41]  [0.46]  [0.64] 
D (lnGDPt-1* lnEXPORTSt-1)    -0.060     
    [0.44]     
D (lnGDPPC* lnEXPORTSt-1)      0.023   
      [0.11]   
F-test (p-value)    (long-run) 
Exports:  
p = 0.10 
GDP:  
p = 0.84 
(long-run) 
Exports:  
p = 0.07 
GDPPC:  
p = 0.85 
(short-run) 
Exports:  
p = 0.17  
(long-run) 
Exports:  
p = 0.02 
Sargan test (p-value)  1.000  1.000  1.000  0.100 
Second-order AR  
(p-value) 
0.842  0.600  0.612  0.196 
Note: Robust z statistics in brackets: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. No. of Observations = 162. Other 
variables used but not reported: Skill intensity, NPI, and GDPGR. Year dummies are included. 
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V. Conclusion 
 
  This paper has provided evidence that China's outward FDI is mainly driven by the 
desire to secure export markets. The transaction-enforcing motive  is evidenced as the 
dominant factor in various specifications. In addition, we have disentangled causal effects 
by using  dynamic GMM methodology  and uncovered  some  interesting interactions 
between exports and FDI. In the presence of exports China's FDI f lows to low-wage 
countries. These results support views that China is a major supplier  to low income 
countries, and that Chinese firms try to expand this competitive advantage by engaging in 
FDI.  
 
  Four  observations are  offered regarding the limitations of this study and 
suggestions for further research.  First, by excluding FDI to the US and Hong Kong and 
Macao we failed to account for nearly 30% of China's FDI.  It can be argued that in the case 
of Hong Kong that outward FDI is of a different nature than other Chinese investments.  
Specifically these investments  focus much  more on services and transport. For future 
research, using an updated series it may be of interest to include FDI from Hong Kong to 
obtain a more complete understanding of Chinese investment after the return of Hong 
Kong.  Our rationale for excluding the U.S. is more arbitrary, though including the US does 
not change the results.  Ideally the U.S. should be included but it would make more sense to 
disaggregate states or regions in the U.S.   Unfortunately these data are currently 
unavailable. We acknowledge a weakness of our analysis in that we cannot exclude the 
possibility that some portion of China's overall FDI is market seeking, and geared towards 
high-skill countries because much of it ends up in the US. 
 
  A second qualification of the results is that our data set that ends in 2002.  We may 
find that after 2002 other determinants of FDI have become more important as China's 
growth has more and more come to rely on the stable supply of natural resources 
(UNCTAD 2006). Also, with the increase in economic power, geopolitical interests have 
become more important to China.  For example, the popular press suggests that FDI from 
China “buys” political support in developing countries (The Economist, October 26, 2006).   17 
Again, these are interesting topics for future research. 
 
  Third, we focus on approved FDI mainly from state owned companies. In this 
respect we acknowledge that China is somewhat unique because the country is run by a 
centralized bureaucracy. Critics therefore might argue that although approved FDI indeed 
captures a substantial portion of total FDI this investment may be distorted by the political 
process and not driven by market forces alone. Although we agree that China's unique 
characteristics are important, we wish to stress that in most developing countries the role of 
the state is large and restrictions on cross-border capital movements severe. 
 
  Finally, we have focussed on the locational determinants of FDI, thereby 
disregarding a large literature that deals with the internal dynamics of FDI (for surveys see: 
Dunning 1988 and Riemens 1989). In this respect FDI is explained by arguing that outward 
investment follows a specific path that can be linked to stages of a country’s economic 
development. As  was mentioned  earlier Liu et al. (2005) investigated the internal 
determinants of FDI for China and concludes that the country is following a standard 
pattern that is highly influenced by rising GDP.  As we move forward with our research on 
this topic we will consider the possibility of merging  this strand of the literature with an 
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